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In this Letter, we present quantum secret sharing and secret splitting protocols with single photons
running forth and back between the participating parties. The protocol has a high intrinsic efficiency,
namely all photons except those chosen for eavesdropping check could be used for sharing secret.
The participants need not to announce the measuring bases at most of the time and this reduces
the classical information exchanged largely.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c
The security of the secret message transmitted has be-
come one of the most important issues for modern eco-
nomic and security activities. The goal of cryptogra-
phy is to make secret message only readable for the two
authorized parties, the sender, Alice and the receiver,
Bob, and unintelligible for any unauthorized man, say
an eavesdropper Eve. To date, the only proven secure
crypto-system in the classical information theory is the
one-time-pad scheme [1] in which the key is required to
be as long as the message and is used just one time.
The security of the message transmitted in this scheme
depends entirely on the randomness of the private key.
Alice and Bob have to distribute a lot of key before they
start the secure communication. Quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) has provided a secure way for transmit-
ting private keys and it has progressed quickly [2] since
an original QKD protocol was proposed by Bennett and
Brassard, the BB84 scheme [3]. The nocloning theorem
of quantum state [4] plays an important role in its secu-
rity.
Another applications of quantum mechanics within the
field of information is quantum secret sharing (QSS)
which is a quantum counterpart of classical secret sharing
[5]. One of the main goals of QSS is to distribute private
keys among the three, or more generally, multi- parties
securely. With the key, the sender, Alice can divide the
message into N shares such that the other parties can
read out the message only when they cooperate, and any
set of less thanN shares can get no information about the
message. An original QSS scheme, the HBB99 scheme
[6] was proposed by Hillery, Buzˇek and Berthiaume in
1999 using three-particle entangled Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) states. In this scheme, the three par-
ties, Alice, Bob and Charlie choose randomly two MBs,
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σx and σy to measure the particles in their hands in-
dependently. When they all choose σx or one chooses
σx and the others choose σy, their results are corre-
lated and will be kept for generating key, otherwise they
discard the results. Its intrinsic efficiency, the ratio of
number of theoretical valid transmitted qubits to the
number of transmitted qubits is about 50% as half of
the instances will be abandoned. Karlsson, Koashi and
Imoto (KKI) put forward a QSS scheme [7] with two-
photon polarization-entangled states, and its intrinsic
efficiency is also 50%. Now, there are many theoretic
and experimental studies on QSS, for instance in Refs.
[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
Most existing QSS protocols use entangled states and
the participants choose randomly one of two sets of mea-
suring bases(MBs), for examples the protocols proposed
in Refs. [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. The in-
trinsic efficiency of these protocols is usually 50%. Some
techniques from QKD for improving the intrinsic effi-
ciency [17, 21, 22] can be used for improving their effi-
ciency in some QSS protocols. For example, the favored-
measuring-basis technique [21] and the measuring-basis-
encrypted technique [22] are extended to the multiparty
QSS schemes in Ref. [16]. In the measuring-basis-
encrypted QSS scheme, a three-party control key is gen-
erated first among the three parties, and they are used
repeatedly to control the use of the alternative MBs. With
a quantum storage [23, 24, 25], delayed measurement is
possible and the efficiency of QSS can also be improved
[17].
Entanglement is not necessary in quantum secret shar-
ing. In Ref. [19], Guo and Guo proposed a QSS protocol
without entanglement based on a modified BB84 QKD
protocol and the efficiency is improved to approach 100%,
with the use of quantum data storage. Single photons
are ideal source for quantum communication. However
at present, faint laser pulses are used to as approximate
single photon sources. Recently we proposed a QKD pro-
2tocol by using faint laser pulses travelling back and forth
between the two parties [26].
In this Letter, we present a QSS protocol without en-
tanglement by combining the idea for QSS with QKD [19]
and the QKD protocol with faint laser pulses, the BID-
QKD protocol in Ref. [26]. In the BID-QKD protocol,
photon polarization states are used to encode informa-
tion. First Bob prepares photons in one of the four pos-
sible states |± z〉, ±x〉 randomly and then sends them to
Alice. Alice performs some unitary operation to encode
the information and then returns the photons to Bob.
Bob reads out Alice’s operation by making measurement.
It was shown that the protocol is still secure if the number
of photons in a pulse does not exceed two. Its intrinsic
efficiency is improved to be 100%, and it does not require
the use of a quantum data storage. Moreover, the clas-
sical information exchanged is reduced since the parties
of communication need not to announce the information
about the measuring basis (MB) in most instances. It is
feasible with present-day technique. We also apply the
idea to quantum secret splitting.
It is noted that any QKD protocol can be used for
secret sharing if Alice can distribute a private key with
each of the other parties. Let us use three parties, Alice,
Bob and Charlie in secret sharing as an example, the
naive-QKD QSS protocol. Alice creates the private key
KB with Bob, and KC with Charlie. However one of
the two parties Bob and Charlie maybe dishonest and
the key they use to encrypt are denoted by K ′B and K
′
C
respectively. Alice needs to determine whether the key
K ′A = K
′
B ⊕ K
′
C obtained by combining Bob’s key and
Charlie’s key is the same as her key KA = KB ⊕ KC ,
where ⊕ means summing modulo 2. The process can be
achieved by choosing random a sufficiently large subset
of bits in the key K ′A to compare the results with those
in the key KA. If the error rate is zero, Alice confirms
that there is no dishonest one among Bob and Charlie,
and she sends the ciphertext to them after encrypting it
with the key KA; otherwise she has to abort the secret
message communication. In this way, secret sharing can
be accomplished with private keys and the main goal of
QSS is to distribute a key among the parties efficiently.
QSS is more efficient for implementing the task of
multi-party secret sharing than the above naive proto-
col based on QKD. QSS is also secure as the legitimate
parties can determine eavesdropping. QSS also reduces
the resource requirement [6, 7, 19]. A figure of merit is
the total efficiency η defined as [27, 28].
η =
bs
qt + bt
, (1)
where bs is the number of secret bits in the key, qt is the
number of qubit used, and bt is the number of classical
bits exchanged between the parties. For example, the
total efficiency of BB84 [3] is η = 25% as half of the
instances will be discarded and at least one bit of classical
information exchanged for each qubit, i.e., bs = 0.5, qt =
1, bt = 1. In the naive-QKD QSS protocol, Alice creates
the keys KB and KC with Bob and Charlie respectively,
and the total efficiency for a multi-party key is η = η
B
·
η
c
= 12.5%. The HBB99 QSS protocol [6] needs one and
half bits of classical information for each qubit and half
qubit is useful. Its total efficiency is η
HBB99
= 0.5
1+1.5
=
20%. So is the KKI QSS protocol [7].
In the following text, we present a QSS protocol us-
ing two bi-directional QKD protocols proposed in Ref.
[26] with single photons. This protocol spares the use of
quantum data storage. We will present the idea with a
three-party case first, and the generalization to N parties
is also presented.
For creating the key KA, Alice prepares a two-photon
product state |ψ〉A = |φ〉B ⊗ |φ〉C , and |φ〉B and |φ〉C
are produced with two conjugate bases randomly: the
rectilinear basis σz (i.e., | + z〉 = |0〉, | − z〉 = |1〉) and
diagonal basis σx (i.e., | + x〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), | − x〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)). Thus the states of the B and C photons
at Alice are randomly in one of the four states {|+z〉, |−
z〉, |+x〉, |−x〉} independently. She then sends the photon
B to Bob and C to Charlie. Bob and Charlie choose
randomly the two unitary operations U = iσy = |0〉〈1| −
|1〉〈0| and I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| for most photons except
those chosen randomly for eavesdropping check. For the
sampling photons, they choose randomly one of the two
measuring bases (MBs) σz and σx to measure them, and
then they tell Alice their MBs and results. Alice analyzes
the error rate of the sampling photons, and determines
whether there is an eavesdropper in the line. This is
the first eavesdropping check. For other photons, Bob
and Charlie send them back to Alice after encoding with
the unitary operations, and Alice measures them with
the same MBs σ
B
σ
C
∈{σzσz, σzσx, σxσz , σxσx} as she
prepares them. The nice feature of the U operation is
that it flips the state in both measuring basis, i.e., the
effect of the operation U is only to negate (e.g., |0〉 →
|1〉, |1〉 → |0〉 ) the quantum states in the same measuring
basis [26, 35], i.e.,
U |+ z〉 = −| − z〉, U | − z〉 = |+ z〉, (2)
U |+ x〉 = | − x〉, U | − x〉 = −|+ x〉. (3)
Alice will get deterministic outcome for each photon re-
turned in an ideal condition.
For the security of whole process for QSS, Alice needs
to choose randomly a sufficiently subset of result to ana-
lyze for the eavesdropping check after the quantum com-
munication is finished. This is the second eavesdropping
check for creating the multi-party private key. The dif-
ference of the state before she sends out and receives
them is just the combined effect of the unitary opera-
tions performed by Bob and Charlie. As the operations
do not change the photons’ MBs, the three parties do
not need to announce the information about the MBs for
most photons except the sampling ones. Then the uni-
tary operations I and U can represent the bits 0 and 1
respectively, and each photon can carry one bit of secret
message between two parties. The total efficiency of this
3QSS approaches η = 100% as bs = 1, bt = 0, qt = 1.
Because some qubits have been used in the two error
analysis, the efficiency is less 1. Suppose there are δ por-
tion of transmitted qubits are used in each error checking,
then the total efficiency becomes
η = (1− δ)2, (4)
and 0 < δ ≤ 1/2. In the extreme case, δ = 1/2, and
the efficiency becomes 25%. When δ approaches zero, η
approaches 100%, and in general 0.25 ≤ η < 1. Usually δ
is very small and is negligible, for instance as in Ref.[29],
and η approaches 1.
We now discuss the security of this QSS. It is pointed
out that a QSS is secure for any eavesdropper if Alice
can prevent the potential dishonest one between Bob and
Charlie, say Bob* from eavesdropping the quantum com-
munication [7]. Then the security depends on the pro-
cess that Alice and Charlie* can detect the dishonest
one, Bob*, if he eavesdrops the quantum channel. In
fact, the process of this QSS is equal to two BID-QKD
protocols [26] whose security bases on two BB84 QKD
protocols [3, 30, 31, 32] with single photons. Alice can
synchronously create a privateKB andKC with Bob and
Charlie respectively. In the end, Alice obtains the key
KA = KB ⊕ KC . For preventing Bob* from eavesdrop-
ping, Alice and Charlie* just accomplish a BID-QKD
process which is secure using single photons as quantum
information carrier with two eavesdropping checks as a
unknown state cannot be cloned [4], and the action of
Bob* will disturb the quantum system and introduces
error in the result in KC∗. The relation between the in-
formation I0(ε) and the error rate ε introduced by Bob*
can be obtained
I0(ε) ≤ −ε log2 ε− (1− ε) log2(1 − ε). (5)
The probability Pd = ε that Bob* is detected will in-
crease with the information I0(ε). If the error rate is
low, the information I0(ε) is small, and then the par-
ties can distill a private key with privacy amplification
[2]. Otherwise, they abandon the result. Certainly, the
post-processing should include the error correction part.
It is straightforwardly to generalize this QSS to multi-
party secret sharing. Alice need only prepare a n-photon
product state |ψ〉A and sends them to the other parties
respectively, i.e., she sends the i-th photon to the i-th
party. The total wave function Alice prepares is
|ψ〉A =
n∏
i=1
⊗|φ〉i, (6)
where |φ〉i ∈ {| + z〉, | − z〉, | + x〉, | − x〉}. In this way,
the multi-party QSS protocol is composed of n BID-QKD
protocols.
Another function of QSS is to split the secret message
[6, 7]. The present QSS protocol can be used to accom-
plish the task if we modify some part of the procedures
following the ideas in quantum secure direct communi-
cation [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. We also restrict our dis-
cussion to three parties. There are two possible ways
for doing the secret splitting. The first one follows the
idea in the Ping-Pong deterministic secure communica-
tion protocol [33, 34] in which the photons are trans-
mitted one by one and it is asymptotically secure when
the number of the qubits transmitted is large [33]. The
other one is to use the quantum secure direct commu-
nication (QSDC) protocol [35] in which the photons are
transmitted in a quantum data block and the message
is encoded after the parties of communication confirm
that the quantum channel is secure [35, 36]. For secret
splitting, Alice prepares a random number string L, and
adds it to the secret message S, i.e., G = L ⊕ S. The
task of splitting the message is that Alice sends the string
L to Bob and G to Charlie, and they can read out the
message S = L ⊕G when they collaborate. To this end,
Alice requires Bob and Charlie send to her the polarized
photons B and C. Assume the states of photons sent by
Bob and Charlie are |φ〉B and |φ〉C respectively, where
|φ〉B , |φ〉C ∈ {| + z〉, | − z〉, | + x〉, | − x〉}. Alice chooses
randomly the control mode or the message mode, similar
to Refs. [33] for the photons B and C independently .
When she chooses the control mode, Alice measures the
photons one of the two measuring bases(MBs) , σz and
σx, randomly. She requires Bob or Charlie to publish her
or his information about the state of the polarized pho-
tons. When the message mode is chosen, Alice encodes L
and C on the states |φ〉B and |φ〉C with the unitary oper-
ation I or U according to the bit 0 or 1 in L and G. She
uses the results obtained with control mode as the sam-
pling photons to analyze the error rate and determines
whether there is an eavesdropper in the line. Alice needs
to add some redundancy randomly on the sequence of B
and C photons using the unitary operations I and U .
In fact, this protocol for splitting the secret message is
similar to two Ping-Pong protocols with single photons
[34]. The difference is just that the states of the photons
are prepared with two sets of MBs σz and σx randomly
as compared to only a single MB in Ref. [34]. Though
a small difference, it improves the security largely. The
relation between the information obtained by an eaves-
dropper successfully and the probability that the parties
detect her/him is the same as that for creating a private
key, shown in equation (5).
Taking the probability of choosing sampling photons
for eavesdropping check ps into account, the probability
for Bob* (Eve) to eavesdrop each qubit successfully is
P (1, ps, ε) =
1− ps
1− (1− ε)ps
. (7)
If Bob* (Eve) eavesdrops n bits of the qubits transmitted,
the probability for Bob* (Eve) to successfully eavesdrop
becomes
P (n, ps, ε) = (
1− ps
1− (1 − ε)ps
)n. (8)
4For ε, ps > 0, the probability P (n, ps, ε) decrease expo-
nentially. When the n is sufficiently large, it approaches
zero.
The information that Bob*(Eve) successfully eaves-
drops is I(ε) = nI0(ε) which is small with a low error
rate. For example, if ε = 0.1, n = 10000, Ps = 0.1, then
I0(ε = 0.1) ≤ 0.47, P (10000, ps, ε) = 10
−48.
The other way for splitting the secret message can im-
prove the security with the QSDC protocol [35] based
on quantum data block [35, 36] at the cost of storing
the quantum states for some times. The whole quantum
communication can be divided into two procedures [35]:
(1) the secure doves sending phase; (2) the message cod-
ing and doves returning phase. It equals to two quantum
one time pad QSDC [35]. In the first phase, Bob and
Charlie prepare their quantum state string L and G in-
dependently with the two MBs, σz and σx. It means
that Bob and Charlie send a group of doves to Alice re-
spectively. In the second phase, Alice, Bob and Charlie
determine whether there is an eavesdropper or dishon-
est one monitoring the quantum channel. Alice encodes
the message on the two groups of the doves if there is
no one eavesdropping the quantum channel, and sends
them back to Bob and Charlie. Otherwise, they abort
the communication.
For eavesdropping check, Alice has to store the two se-
quence of quantum states that Bob and Charlie prepare
with the two MBs randomly and send to her. The secu-
rity is discussed in Ref. [35] in an ideal condition. With
a noisy and lossy channel, the quantum communication
can be strengthened with quantum privacy amplification
[39].
In order to be secure in practice, single photon source
and quantum data storage technique are required. These
techniques are principally available [23, 24, 25, 40, 41].
With the improvement of technology, the technique may
be practically used for quantum information.
In summary, we have proposed a QSS protocol for cre-
ating a private multi-party key following the idea in bi-
directional QKD with practical faint laser pulse [26]. The
QKD with high total efficiency is useful for QSS as it re-
duce the resource requirement for secret sharing.
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